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FACTORS INFLUENCING PRISON INDUSTRY
\

Erik Dill, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1999
Prison industry has a sporadic history in the United States.
Interstate trade of prison made goods was banned from 1940 until
1979; business and labor opposed slavelike competition from early
programs.

This thesis studies competitive prisoner work, deemed

prison industry, as different from state-use labor.
Formal theory on prison industry is inadequate. Rusche would
suggest that unemployment directly effects incarceration, and prison
industry develops to provide labor in economic upswings.

Since 1980

prison industry expanded and unemployment fell, but incarceration did
not decline.

Therefore, this study focuses on .theory genesis.

Ex

planations for incarceration can assume prison is exploitative.
Legal history suggests labor strength and incarceration policy might
predict prison industry.
This study uses state level rates to predict survey data mea
suring the nature and extent of prison industry. Multiple regression
found a significant relationship between incarceration and the prison
industry rate.

Logistic regression tied employment to the existence

of prison industry and job training.
conditions promoting prison industry.

Theory must find more links to
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Competitive prison industry has seen a marked resurgence in
the past twenty years.

It has seen redress in the media, in politi

cal rhetoric, and in legislation at both the state and federal level.
From a business aspect, several management models have been gener
ated, and a few have found application in existing prison industry
programs.

However, explanations for why prisoners are used in

competitive industry, whether they be Rusche and Kirchheimer's for
mal theory or the conventional wisdom that prison labor provides a
cheap and/or exploitable workforce, have largely been accepted at
face value.

This study aims to question the motivations for prison

industry, with a goal of steering research in the direction of bet
ter theory.
Formal theory on the creation of modern prison industry pro
grams is limited to the theories of Rusche and Kirchheimer (1967),
which link prison industry programs inversely with unemployment via
the incarceration rate.

In other words, as unemployment falls, so

too does incarceration, albeit more slowly.

Prison industry pro

grams form in order to satisfy some of the demand for labor, created
by low unemployment, by placing the incarcerated in the workforce.
As unemployment rises, criminals are removed from the general popu
lation and the workforce, and put into prisons where they are large-
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ly idle.
By observing rates over the past twenty years, we see that
prison industry programs are now operating in most states.
incarceration rates have not begun to fall.

However,

This is not indicative

of the political and economic environment that Rusche and Kirchheimer
deemed necessary for incarceration to switch from oppressive punish
ment to rehabilitative employment.

In simple terms, we are current

ly tapping inmates due to the shortage of workers, yet we are still
punishing as if we needed criminals removed from the economy.
This theoretical inconsistency led the author to search for
other ways to explain this recent growth in prison industry. Without
other theoretical explanations (save the conventional wisdom that
employers tend to seek cheaper, or more exploitable, labor sources;
an idea more readily studied by an economist), focus was shifted to
theory explaining why we incarcerate.

The most obvious answers in

volve the calls for the punishment or rehabilitation of criminals.
Theorists suggest that socio-economic conditions can predict who
goes to prison.

Lichtenstein (1996), for example, suggests that

incarceration, and subsequent prisoner labor, has historically been
a form of racial oppression, and functioned as a replacement for
slavery.

Reiman (1990) argues that motivation for incarceration

lies in economics, that crimes of the poor receive the harshest
sentences.

William Julius Wilson (Tonry, 1995, pp. 68-80) looks at

the race and economic questions from a slightly different angle,
with the micro-level theory of marriageable males.

Rather than
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trying to find structural causes, this theory suggests that men who
are employed and married are less likely to be incarcerated.
(1995) extrapolates this theory to the macro level.

Tonry

Low employment,

rather than high unemployment, becomes the reason minorities and the
poor are over-represented in the prison population; the difference
being that unemployment rates measure those who recently lost their
jobs and are seeking new ones, while employment rates measure those
who are currently holding jobs.
While the combined statistics of unemployment and employment
leave a good portion of the population unaccounted for, it is unde
niable that these two statistics extensively covaried.

If one took

the logical flaw of Rusche and Kirchheimer to heart, it would make
sense that employment may not serve as a macro-level predictor of
incarceration.

Uncertain as to what macro-level predictor of incar

ceration would explain the conditions that produced prison industry,
I felt two things must be done.

First, a measure of incarceration

policy, the incarceration rate, should be included.

Secondly, I

felt that the critical literature must be re-examined, to determine
if a different explanation of prison industry could be found.
While I knew Rusche and Kirchheimer should not yield accurate
results, !,did not feel the theorists were too far from the truth
about the conditions that yield prison industry.
measures of

Rather than using

worker status to predict prison industry, I decided to

explore the use of a measure of labor market strength, the ability
of workers to make demands.

At first, workers who could make de-
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mands would resist the occurrence of prison industry.

However, once

prison industry did inject itself into the economy, organized labor
would then attempt to make the prison industry program's competition
a fair competition, in which wages and other costs of production
would be similar to those incurred by the private sector.

To mea

sure labor market strength, I chose the labor union membership rate.
Labor union membership seemed the most accessible of
indicators1 of labor strength.

macro-level

Also, labor unions have been his

torically linked to the legal restrictions on prison industry, being
a force pushing for several pieces of legislation which effectively
banned the practice from 1940 until the 1980's (Misrahi, 1996).
With the independent variables determined (incarceration,
labor union membership, employment, and unemployment rates), the
next step was to collect data on the conditions of current prison
industry programs.

In an effort to not only get the most recent

data, but to also help ensure that this researcher's division be
tween competitive and non-competitive labor was properly accounted
for, a phone survey of state prison officials was conducted.

Of

ficials were asked both demographic data about their state's pro
grams and also about the conditions of their state�s prison in
dustry programs' (where applicable).

After data were collected and

coded, the goal was to weigh this information against the selected
independent variables in order to look for patterns, on which new
theory could be built.
The preliminary nature of this study cannot be stressed enough.
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While regression techniques are used in the analysis, there has been
a lack of study in this field, and I feel that generalizing conclu
sions would be premature.

This study is focused on studying compe

titive prison industry as a separate phenomenon from non-competitive
prisoner labor, a separation justified bot� economically and legally.
State-use prisoner labor prevents private industry profit from pri
son work programs. Plus, federal regulation has historically focused
on restricting the trade of prison made goods (which mainly impacts
prison industry), rather than regulating prisoner work conditions
(which would impact all prisoner labor).

Both of these assertions

justify treating prison industry, as defined in this study, as sep
arate from state-use prisoner labor.

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
When searching through the substantial writings on prisoner
labor, it is rare to find academic work that makes the distinction
between competitive prison industry and non-competitive, state-use
prisoner labor.

Finding literature that offers explanations for the

existence of prison industry is an even greater task.

For this rea

son, I have spent some time blending in reasons we incarcerate indi
viduals.

This blending allowed the sorting of the rather diverse

writings on prisoner labor into three main categories:

(1) correc

tional reports, (2) theory and private interests, and (3) a prisoner
rights and law review.

Reports by and for correctional agencies

tend to focus on the rehabilitative or economic aspects of the in
dustry programs.

Theory and articles from private interests tend to

speak of the issues of human rights, for prisoners and for outside
workers, and the fairness of competition, for business and for work
ers.

Federal laws are arguably the single greatest influence on

industry programs.

Since 1929's Hawes-Cooper Act, _federal laws have

focussed on the economic realities of prison labor programs; the
distribution of funds generated by, and the fairness of the compe
tition provided by the programs.
Presenting the topic in this manner will provide a more logi
cal way of understanding the origins and history of prison industry
6
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programs, and will provide groundwork for research choices.

By ex

plaining the current incarnation of prison industry first (through
the research briefs), we can get some idea of the current concep
tualization and purported functions of today's prison industry pro
grams.

The private interest and incarceration theory articles help

us to understand not only the historical social context of prison
industry, but also to begin to understand the reasons popular debate
on the topic is full of emotionally charged rhetoric and limited
substance.

By finishing with a review of law, legal perspectives,

and prisoner rights, we can put in perspective the history of pri
soner work, the reasons for trade restrictions, and the status of
the prisoner worker.

This should make clear the argument that pri

son workers are a small part of a much larger economic reality, and
that other indicators of economic reality can serve as predictors of
the occurrence of competitive prison industry.
Correctional Reports
Reports by and for correctional agencies include the 1998
Correctional Industry Association's (CIA) directory, reports and
briefs from the National Institute of Justice, and selected reports
from state level correctional agencies (for example, PRIDE indus
tries out of Florida).

When examining these reports, one must

realize that many of them were written with two purposes in mind;
first to inform readers of the industry programs, and secondly to
promote the industry programs.

Putting the advertising aside, one
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can use these reports to gain comprehensive statistics about a given
state's prisoner labor programs, the proposed organizational models
for the industry programs, and the relatively diverse uses of pri
soner labor.
For anyone wishing to study the subjects of prisoner labor or
prison industry, the Correctional Industry Association (CIA) direc
tory (1998) is an excellent resource.

Published annually, the direc

tory provides not only demographic data on prisoner labor programs,
it also provides valuable contact numbers for prison officials fam
iliar with each state's programs and the laws that enable them. This
type of reference is vital, for the laws regarding prison industry
greatly determine the conditions under which programs function on a
state-by-state basis.

Included in the directory are lists of Prison

Industry Enhancement (PIE) programs, which are programs which meet
federal guidelines for interstate trade with the private sector.

As

of the directory's publication, thirty-eight states have received
PIE certification (CIA Directory, 1998).
Reports and briefs published through the National Institute of
Justice are published more sporadically than the CIA directory, so
the information is often dated.

The benefit of the-National Insti-

tute of Justice reports is they provide information on the concep
tualization and history of modern prison industry programs.

These

reports (Auerbach, Sexton, Farrow & Lawson, 1988) offer six theo
retical models for private sector--correctional relations:
1.

Customer model - The state owns and operates the prison
factory. The private firm merely buys the end product.
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2.

Controlling customer model - State correctional agencies
still own and operate the facility. In addition to being
the main recipient of goods and services, the private firm
also takes an active role in the prison industry program's
management.

3.

Employer model - The private firm owns and operates the
business. Correctional officials provide inmate laborers,
at the discretion and under the supervision of the private
firm.

4.

Investor model - The state operates a business that is
capitalized, at least in part, by the private sector.

5.

Manager model - The private sector is contracted by the
state to manage the prison industry program.

6.

Joint Venture - Ownership and management of the prison
industry program is shared between the state and the pri
vate agency. (pp. 16-17)

It is worth noting that the term Joint Venture is sometimes
used to denote a prison industry program in a more general sense. In
fact, Sexton (1995) later uses the term as an umbrella to cover em
ployer, customer, and mixed (termed Manpower) models.
Through the National Institute of Justice sources, we also can
trace the development and spread of current prison industry pro
grams.

The Great Depression led to the federal outlaw of the inter

state trade of prison made goods with the Sumners-Ashurst Act in
1940 (Misrahi, 1996), and that ban lasted nearly forty years until
the Prison Industries Enhancement Act (a.k.a., the Percy Amendment)
in 1979 (Sexton, Auerbach, Farrow, Lawson, et al., 1985).

States

which were amongst the first to re-enter private sector involvement
were predominantly in the western United States, with two states
(Mississippi and Florida) in the south (Sexton, et al., 1985).

The
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brief The Private Sector and Prison Industries also included charts
that show, as of 1985, each state's position on the legal status of
prison industry programs (Sexton, Farrow, & Auerbach, 1985), such as
state legislation restricting the types of work that prisoners could
perform.

That same brief also mentions the status of prisoners em

ployed in a prison industry setting, noting that prisoners were
generally not considered employees •in the strict legal sense of
the word,• (p. 7) and therefore, not entitled to coverage under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
Not only do national associations and federal institutes print
materials reporting the trends in prison industry, but individual
states often produce literature on their programs.

The state of

Florida publishes an annual report on its PRIDE enterprises.
annual report is quite detailed.

The

It includes descriptions of com

panies and industries, fiscal information in both dollars and per
centage, and follow up information evaluating the annual progress
towards PRIDE's mission statement (PRIDE Enterprises, 1997).

Ex

amples of the detailed information are inmate pay (with deductions
detailed) and job placement rates for released inmate workers. Other
states, such as California, make information available on the com
panies working with the department of corrections, along with finan
cial reports detailing, by industry, inmate contributions to family
support, restitution, room and board, etc., (California D.O.C.,
1998).

There are also states that have websites for their various

prison industry products, (e.g. -Oregon's "Prison Blues• jeans
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label, located at http://www.teleport.com/-jailjean).
Theories of Punishment and Private Interests
When researching prison industry, one is overwhelmed with op
inions on prisoner labor, which can be generally attributed to the
exploitative social history of prisoner labor.

Few articles deal

with prison industry as a separate phenomenon from prisoner labor,
despite specific legislation covering it.

Academic pieces fail to

offer any logical causative theory on prison industry in an explicit
manner. Hence, this researcher was forced to look at causative theory
for incarceration in general. When explaining motivations for in
carceration, academics often cite wider social problems--be it ra
cism, social hierarchies, or economic oppression--as a cause for the
denial of freedom.

Editorial pieces tend to either frame the issue

in terms of the benefits of industry programs, or criticize prison
industry programs in terms of fairness of competition. Because labor
from prisoners is such a controversial topic, such articles some
times fail to get beyond political rhetoric and half-truths, and
subsequentially miss valid ethical concerns.
The writings of Rusche and Kirchheimer offer-the idea that
punishment is related to worker availability in the private sector.
This idea is founded in the assumption that the standards of living
within a prison must always be lower than those of the •lowest so
cially significant proletarian class• in the private sector (Rusche,
1978, pp. 3-4).

This assumption is tied into the concept that pri-
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soners can serve as an auxiliary, if not always desirable, labor
force.

Prisoners serve as workers when economic conditions result

in a shortage of labor. When there are masses of unemployed workers,
prisoners are punished and can, at times, be denied basic needs, as
their living conditions must be worse than that of the outside mem
ber of the lower class.

Rusche and Kirchheimer (1967) offer Germany

from 1928 through 1932 as an example.

Conversely, when workers are

scarce, punishment is used to make the unwilling work, and prisoners
are seen as an exploitable work force (Rusche, 1978).

Rusche and

Kirchheimer (1968) cite the Prussian, French, and English tendency
"to use prisoners in their efforts during World War I as an example"
(pp. 160-162).

It is during this time of worker shortage that unem

ployment falls, crime rates drop, and incarceration declines (Rusche
& Kirchheimer, 1968). The economic backdrop of America in the early
to-mid 1920's had all three of these indicators in line, and prison
industry was booming (Rusche, 1978).
After the economy crashed in 1929, a long period of legal re
strictions ensued.

Today,

prison industry programs are regaining

prominence in this country.

This resurgence, which began nearly

twenty years ago, has seen the drop in unemployment_that Rusche and
Kirchheimer would have predicted.

But in that twenty year period,

crime rates have only recently begun to level off.

In fact, prison

overcrowding continues to be a problem and incarceration rates con
tinue to climb (Tonry, 1995).

This contradicts the overall liberal

progressive climate Rusche predicted would be necessary to shift
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penal philosophy from punitive torment to job orientation (Rusche,
1978).

While the conclusion that low unemployment would lead to

industry tapping prisoners for their labor would seem possible, the
drop in incarceration rate that would signify this shift has not
happened.

This failure in premise led me to search for alternative

explanations for the growth of prison industry programs.
Unable to find alternative explanations for competitive prison
industry (outside the conventional explanations of state budgets or
teaching prisoners skills, ideas which would be difficult to examine
at a national level), the literature review focused on explanations
of why we incarcerate.

While Rusche and Kirchheimer's idea of what

motivates prison industry would seem outdated (since incarceration
no longer seems tied to unemployment), certainly the reasons we in
carcerate should influence how we treat the incarcerated.

Several

works, inspired by Rusche and Kirchheimer, have tried to prove a
connection between social conditions and incarceration, but most get
results that are conflicting or contradictory (Chiricos & Delone,
1992).

Still, the pool from which prison industry workers are se

lected would reflect any social or economic biases that may be pre
sent in our criminal justice system.

Likewise, those biases may

influence which prisoners are involved in prison industry, and which
ones are.not.
When exploring scholarly works on incarceration, the theme of
oppression rings throughout.

Incarceration, and the labor involved

within, is about degradation and punishment for the offender.

Con-
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versely, incarceration means safety and prosperity for the free
citizen.

It is the assertion of many critical theorists that pri

sons have historically over-represented minorities and the poor, and
that prisoner labor has often been used dubiously, as an exploi
table, quasi-slave labor source.
Lichtenstein's Twice the Work of Free Labor (1996) talks of
the use of convict labor in the reconstructionist south as a replace
ment for slave labor.

The convicts, who were disproportionately

black, were used by government and leased to private enterprise.
At the time, convicts could be forced to do work that free labor
wouldn't, and were often used in lieu of striking workers in such
occupations as mining.

Whippings and beatings were common, and work

conditions were unsafe, but this was largely overlooked.

Walker

(1988) paints a similar picture of minority prisoner mistreatment
under a lease system in Texas during the same time period, the late
1800's to early 1900s.
Other scholars examining the late 1800s and early 1900s saw
incarceration patterns that over-represented the poor and uneducated.
Walter Wilson (1971) cited several public officials claiming that
lack of training and employment were key causes of-incarceration,
with property crimes being the most common offense.

He also points

out that "nationwide in 1930 an estimated 75,000 convicts manufac
tured goods with a market value of $100,000,000" (p. 35).

At the

time, practices such as concealing the origin of prison made goods
by creating dummy companies or sewing false labels into prison made
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clothing were gaining the attention of the Federal Trade Commission.
McGinn (1993) collaborates the existence of such fraudulent deals,
and notes the irony of reforming poor, uneducated thieves by teach
ing them a different style of stealing.
These issues of racial and economic bias within the correc
tional system have seen redress by modern scholars.

Reiman (1990)

asserts that the current criminal justice system punishes the crimes
of the poor and often ignores the crimes of the wealthy.

When it

comes to sentencing, white-collar criminals are more likely to re
ceive probation or a fine, whereas common criminals are more likely
to receive a prison sentence.

Tonry (1995) addresses racial bias by

concluding that there is participatory difference in crime, with the
best predictor of desistance from offending being employment and
marriage, a concept that fits well with William Julius Wilson's
marriageable males theory.

Empirical testing of the theory, which

states marriage rates are lower amongst African-Americans due to a
shortage of employed single men, revealed a significant relationship
between economic conditions and marriage rates among African-Ameri
cans, though employment does not explain all the differences between
marriage rates for blacks and whites (Wood, 1995).-0ther scholars
feel that a woman's economic prospects have as much to do with mar
riage outcomes, and suggest that we need to reverse our thinking
J

(Lichter, McLaughlin, Kephart & Landry, 1992).

In other words, per

haps there is a lack of adequately employed females, and therefore
men are not getting married.

Whichever the case, the key issue
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seems to be the economic status gained with employment.

If marriage

affects the conditions of incarceration, it may only be through the
employment rate. 2
Given a social history linking it to exploitation and slavery,
it is no wonder that editorials on prisoner work are emotionally
charged and/or defensive.
benefits of society.

Proponents tend to write in terms of the

Opponents tend to write of the unfair competi

tion provided by inmate labor.

More often than not, these opinions

are addressed in dollar terms or by the roles that stated parties
should have in the political economy.

Too often, words like compe

tition, benefit, and fairness are used in unclear, and sometimes
misleading, ways.
For instance, the federal prison labor division UNICOR, which
produces clothing and furniture for the federal government, holds a
position of superpreference (Gale, 1997). This superpreference means
that if a government agency wants an item that UNICOR can supply, a
UNICOR bid must be accepted even if other bids are lower.

Both Gale

and Nicknish (1995) mention "superpreference as unfair competition
to private contractors" (pp. 89-91).

Nicknish (1995) goes as far as

to estimate 1,429 jobs lost to FPI (Federal Prison-Industries). 3
Steve Schwalb (1996), an assistant director for FPI, responded with
the per dollar spending of FPI income and then criticizing Nick
nish's displacement figures as being inflated •by more than 300 percent• (pp. 110-114).
Perhaps it was done without intent, but all three authors seem
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to miss a few key points.

First, if UNICOR produces items solely

for the federal government, the production is state use.

The issue

is not competition, but rather one of entitlement to government con
tracts.

Secondly, by focusing attention on superpreference's ef

fects on the private sector, we miss what a policy of superprefer
ence really affects--government appropriations.
"UNICOR made $450 million in 1996" (p. 65).

Gale (1997) reports

Combine this with

Schwalb's (1996) 1995 estimate of "one percent of FPI income spent
on new facilities" (p. 110).

Given these figures hold accurate, we

can estimate that UNICOR appropriated $4.5 million of federal money
earmarked for other purposes and used it to construct prison factor
ies in 1996.

Of course, twenty-six times this amount went to staff

and prisoner pay (19% and 7%, respectively).

In an era of trillion

dollar federal budgets, UNICOR's current appropriations seem rela
tively small.

But, if either the percent of income designated for

construction or the UNICOR annual income increases, real dollar fig
ures could inflate rapidly.
Other authors imply that prison industry is a wonderful solu
tion in which everyone benefits.

And in general, ideas like defray

ing incarceration costs and allowing prisoners to do productive work
while earning a savings are noble enough.

Certain policy advisors

go so far as to say they would like to see the total removal of re
strictions on the sale of prison made goods, along with the shift
away from prisoners performing state-use and non-profit doing-good
labor (Grayson, 1997).

As authors like Lichtenstein (1996) have
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stated, many of the laws regarding prison industry came about due to
the beatings, cruelty, and other slave-like conditions present in
early prison industry programs.

Also, being non-competitive does

not mean a program is inherently less valuable.

In 1989, the State

of New York began state-use composting and �ecycling programs.

Dur

ing a three year period, these prison labor programs saved the state
$4.9 million in disposal costs, provided free compost for community
beautification projects, and in 1994 employed 1,000 of New York's
65,000 prison inmate� (Marion, 1994), all in a non-competitive work
environment.

A headlong rush to industrialize prisons could not

only open the door to renewed exploitation, but force us to overlook
the value of programs that have developed in a non-competitive en
vironment.
Authors who write against prison industry programs are also
subject to many of the same errors, with their main theme being fair
ness.

There are many websites devoted to the topic, and they tend

to speak from an everyman, us-against-them mentality.

Hightower

(1996) flashes many names and services rendered, specifically Ore
gonian prisoners manufacturing uniforms for McDonald's.

He states

that prisoners make as little as twenty cents an hour, and cites
Steven Elbow as estimating sales of prison made goods at $9 billion
by the year 2000.

Elbow (1996) has his own website, citing "prison

industry programs taking over jobs in a slaughterhouse and taking
stocking shifts from workers at a Toys-R-Us" (pp. 1-10).

Too often,

sites like these contain information that is too vague to accredit.4
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In an effort to tell us the unfairness of competitive prison in
dustry, these authors blend together ideas, innuendo, and outright
mistakes in such a manner it does no service toward their legitimate
reasons for concern.
Magazines often offer the same ideas with a little more sub
stance to them. Parenti (1996) writes in the Nation that in the mid1980's a Ventura, CA youth facility that provided workers to T.W.A.
as ticket agents. The still employed TWA ticket agents then replaced
unionized flight attendants who happened to be on strike.

While

citing a modern example of how prison industry programs could be
abused, the article then points out an important fact, that prison
ers themselves are forbidden to organize or join labor unions.

That

fact is but one of the interesting issues raised by the laws regard
ing prison industry in this country.
Prisoner Rights and Legal Perspectives
The resurgence of prison industry has led to prisoners taking
on roles they have seldom held in the past: taxpayers, renters, and
as incarcerated providers for their dependents. The courts have made
numerous rulings at the state and federal levels about the status of
prisoners who participate in prison industry programs, but more re
mains unsettled than settled.

The federal legislature has predomi

nantly regulated the conditions of prison industry programs that
deal with interstate commerce.

Intrastate commerce has been left

for the individual states to regulate, which has led to different

20
industry conditions in every state, and nearly as many terms to
scribe those conditions.

de

When examining federal law, it seems clear

that Congress has common ideals for both prison industry programs
and labor union relations, those of voluntariness and of fairness in
practices and competition.
With new prison industry programs emerging, more and more pri
soners are being reinserted into the private market, and potentially
affecting private labor and private enterprise. With this new status
comes questions both of the roles these prisoners play in the cur
rent economy and of the rights these prisoners have obtained through
their industry employment.

In regards to inmates, prison industry

seems to have made vast improvements from the early days chronicled
by Lichtenstein (1996).

However, laws and court rulings, which tend

to focus on economic questions rather than human rights, have left
prisoners with fewer rights and lower status than the free worker.
Prison industry in America is nearly as old as penitentiaries
themselves.

The first penitentiary was built in 1790; and the first

prison to be built intentionally with revenue generating labor in
mind was the Newgate prison in 1797 (Shichor, 1995).

But for over a

century, states were free to set their own rules regarding their
prison industries.

Federal intervention began in 1929 with the

Hawes-Cooper Act, which made goods produced by prisoners subject to
the laws of the state of destination, once imported; with violation
of

Hawes-Cooper criminalized in 1935's Ashurst-Sumners (Sexton, et

al., 1985).

Passed in 1940, Sumners-Ashurst outlawed the interstate
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transport of prison made goods to private interests (Misrahi, 1996),
essentially making interstate prison industry, as defined for this
study, illegal.

The Walsh-Healey act prohibited the use of prisoner

labor in government contracts in excess of $10,000; and subsequent
acts outlawed prisoner labor in construction of highways and air
ports and also in the production of goods for the post office (Sex
ton, et al., 1985).

Misrahi (1996) asserts that the true pressure

to abolish prison industry came from a consolidated effort from both
laborers and businessmen, rather than from human rights activists.
This assertion is interesting, since federal law regarding prison
industry has focused on prohibiting interstate commerce and limiting
government involvement, with the discussion of prisoner rights left
to academics.
It was not until the passage of the Percy Amendment in 1979
that legislation was written with some reference to prisoner status.
The Amendment spelled out the conditions under which prisoner made
goods could be exempt from previous prohibitive legislation.

Qual

ifying programs would be called PIE (Prison Industry Enhancement)
•programs.

Some of the conditions provided in the Amendment are as

follows (Auerbach, et al., 1988):
Inmates must be paid at an equal or greater wage than is
demanded for similar work in that area.
Officials must consult local labor unions during the plan
ning of projects.
Prison labor cannot displace existing workers, violate ex
isting contracts, or enter into industries for which there
is a surplus of available workers.
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Deductions of inmate pay are limited to 80% of the inmate's
gross wage.
Inmates must receive federal and state employment benefits,
including workers compensation. (pp. 10-11)
"The only required deduction is a 5-20% gross wage deduction for
Victim Compensation programs.

In addition, prisoner participation

must be obtained voluntarily" (CIA, 1998, p. 99). "PIE programs must
pay at least minimum wage and the private sector must be involved"
(Misrahi, 1996, p. 421).
While the Percy Amendment still focuses largely on economic
aspects of prison industry (limiting unfair competition), it does
address minimum standards of inmate treatment; in that wages are
required, deductions are limited, and inmates must volunteer to do
the work.

In that these standards still address only interstate

industry, despite revisions with the Justice Assistance Act of 1984
and the Crime Control Act of 1990 (Misrahi, 1996), it can be argued
that the focus of PIE certification is to control interstate labor
practices more than to set standards of inmate treatment.
Part of the reason misinformation exists about prison industry
programs is because the public, interest groups, and even public
officials remain largely unaware of the complex structures of pri
soner labor, much less the complex legal and social structure that
creates prisoner work programs.

One of the goals of this paper is

to generate better theory on the structural conditions and social
relations involved with the genesis of prison industry programs.
Federal involvement regulating prison industry programs has been
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limited to restrictions on interstate commerce, which has left state
governments the lion's share of regulating prison industry.

States

can currently have prison industry programs that function on an
intrastate basis only, or offer services and not goods, that can
legally exist without PIE certifications or standards (Auerbach, et
al., 1988).

This freedom to regulate has resulted in many different

industry conditions, with many different interpretations of what
industry is right and proper in a given state.

States are free to

determine what models of industry are followed, how wages and deduc
tions are handled, and what rights prisoners ultimately have.
Inmate rights are often set by the courts.

This often comes

about as a result of an inmate or interest group bringing action.
For instance, cases have claimed that prison industry should be
covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and prisoner
workers should be treated as employees (Haslam, 1994).

The FLSA's

circular definitions; employer as any person acting directly or in
directly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee,
and employee as any individual employed by an employer; do little to
clear up the debate. The best argument for FLSA coverage probably
lies in the objection claiming prisoner labor to be-unfair compe
tition (Haslam, 1994).

Haslam disagrees with the notion of pri

soner labor providing unfair competition, denying competition as a
motivation for industry programs and citing "the hidden cost of pro
grams like FPI, including job training for relatively unmotivated
workers" (pp. 390-392).

Haslam makes similar mistakes as Nicknish
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(1995) and Gale (1997), by deeming Federal Prison Industries com
petitive.

Rather,

FPI is a state-use system that does not involve

the issue of competition, but rather entitlement.

Also, state im

posed wage deductions can easily change the meaning of any pay scale,
an issue I will discuss in the conclusions section.

Regardless,

Haslam (1994) agrees that the courts are leaning towards providing
FLSA coverage for inmates.
The question of whether or not prison industry workers are
true employees is tied to social history as well as the courts and
the legislature. The abuses previously cited by Lichtenstein (1996),
Walker (1988), and McGinn (1993) would suggest that inmate labor was
used historically as a substitute for slave labor, and focus the de
bate on changes in that condition.
J

The most obvious assertions are

that industry participation is largely voluntary (PIE requires this)
and that physical punishment for poor work performance is theoreti
cally eliminated.

Although the latter point can be questioned (Par

enti, 1996) and can only be judged on a program by program basis,
the former seems a near given in prison industry programs.

Likening

modern prison industry to slavery may be stretching the point thin,
but given the not-uncommon conditions of wage-deductions for room
and board and the custodial control of the worker, comparisons to
share-cropping and indentured servitude have some merit.

Add to

this recent trends toward reviving the chain gang in certain states,
and it should become clear that our ideas about how inmates should
be treated should be given careful consideration.
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As it stands, inmate wages can typically be subject to de
ductions for room and board, taxes, family support, and victim
compensation/assistance (CIA, 1998).

But, as Misrahi (1996) points

out, "prisoners lack certain rights, like the right to unemployment
compensation and the right to unionize or collectively bargain.
Other inmate rights remain unclear, like protection from discrimi
nation in industry employment practices" (pp. 427-429).

Depending

on which wage deductions are allowed, there are a number of legal
statuses the courts could rule prisoners have attained.

Deductions

for FICA could mean that prisoners are entitled to disability as
well as worker's compensation.

Deductions for room and board could

qualify prisoners as residents or tenants in state subsidized hous
ing.

Deductions for victim compensation could complicate civil

suits brought on by the victims.

In other words, wage deductions

give prisoners footing from which to push for more rights and higher
status.
These possible rights may seem improbable, in light of pri
soners' limited right to representation.

Incarcerated felons cannot

vote, even if through industry programs they pay taxes.

Prisoner

workers have not been allowed to join or form labor-unions, or to
collectively bargain, due to the adversarial nature of such organ
izations (Misrahi, 1996).

Presumably to compensate for potential

abuses, Criminal Justice Associates, Inc., recommends that correc
tional officials consult with any group (i.e., unions, human rights
groups, etc.) that might have a negative reaction to a prison in-
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dustry program prior to its initiation (Sexton, et al., 1985).

Pri

vate prisons, like those run by the Corrections Corporation of
America (CCA), often make lawyers available to prisoners in order to
resolve grievances in the most efficient way possible (Gold, 1996).
Since prisoners cannot legitimately organize to discuss their com
plaints, such a resource could lessen the already adversarial rela
tionship between prisoners and correctional officials.
It is fair to say the vast majority of the critical writing,
and a good share of the legislation, on prison industry has focused
on the relative fairness of competition provided by these programs.
Historically, one might infer that, had prison industry been more
reserved, the private sector might not have taken notice.

As it

was, when the economy fell into depression, prison industry programs
were outlawed (Misrahi, 1996).

In fact, the major pieces of legis

lation on prison industry were written in times of economic depres
sion, with the Percy Amendment coming during the depression of the
late 1970s--early 1980s.
Much like the legislation regarding prison industry, the leg
islation regarding labor unions is rooted in the concepts of vol
unteerism and fairness of competition.

The Wagner-act gave non

inmate workers the right to organize and collectively bargain (Co
hen, 1948).

With the right to organize came restrictions, in the

form of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and the Labor-Management Act of
1959 (McAdams, 1964).

First, on the list is the requirement that

union membership be voluntary.

This requirement came about to pro-

27
hibit the closed-shop state, in which union membership was mandatory
for employment (Cohen, 1948).

The issue of volunteerism created

several interpretations by the states.

First, Cohen (1948) des-

cribes right-to-work states as "states in which workers cannot be
forced or coerced to have any affiliation or relation with a labor
�

organization" (pp. 13-18).

Other states have rulings that allow

labor unions to collect dues from non-union members for collective
bargaining services if enough of the company's labor is already
unionized.

Certain practices are also deemed unfair and prohibited

(McAdams, 1964):
secondary boycotts, the bringing of pressure on a second group
of employers or laborers; roving picketing, protests that fol
low a product from factory to wholesaler to retailer; hot car
go contracts, labor agreements in which the employer agrees
not to use unfair goods; and extortion picketing, in which a
union official uses striking workers for personal gain. (pp.
50-55)
In addition to legislation, the United States Congress has held hearings as recently as 1983 (March 23; #98-161) and 1985 (February 27,
March 26; #99-251) regarding the use of violence in labor protests.
The fact is that labor unions and prison industry programs
seem to gain much the same attention from the legislature and the
courts.

In both cases, the concept of fairness of competition has

been the driving force behind regulation.

In both cases, what is

deemed fair varies from state to state. In both cases, where force
and coercion were implied or exercised, the point of voluntariness
became the standard to judge the program or the union.
The location of states most heavily involved in prison in-
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dustry, to the south and the west, led me to wonder if the strength
of the labor market, here defined as the ability of the working
class to make demands of their employers, had anything to do with
whether or not prison industry programs were taking place.

Prison

industry programs are less prevalent in the east, where union mem
bership is higher.

This fits in well with the legal history of pri

son industry, in which labor unions and private interests were the
driving force behind restricting of trade in prison made goods (Mis
rahi, 1996).

The parallels between regulation of prison industry

programs and labor unions, combined with the supposition that labor
unions campaigned to eliminate prison industry programs, led me to
include the labor union membership rate in the causal model.

CHAPTER III
METHODS
In order to evaluate the ideas research and literature have
suggested, four state level rates:

(1) incarceration, (2) employ

ment, (3) unemployment, and (4) labor union membership, were com
pared to data collected measuring the existence and conditions of
prison industry programs.

Prison industry programs are those pro

grams in which prisoners produce an item that is for sale on the
open market (that is, not government consumed) or in which prisoners
provide a type of service that is provided by a non-governmental
labor source.

To collect the data on prison industry, a phone sur

vey of state correctional officials was conducted.

State level data

was selected over prison level data because state legislatures have
historically controlled the existence of prison industry within
their borders.

In other words, prison industry, as defined in the

study, can exist without federal approval (at least at the intra
state level).

Current prison industry programs exist solely within

state institutions (prisons) and employ those with-state imposed
prison sentences.
Rationales and Descriptions of the Variable Choices
Independent Variables
There were four rates chosen to measure either incarceration
29
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or labor market strength.

Descriptions reiterate justifications

found in the literature review.
1.

Incarceration--This rate states the number of incarcerated
It was chosen due

individuals per 100,000 of the adult population.
to its overwhelming presence in the literature.

Not only is it an

intervening variable in Rusche and Kirchheimer's (1967) theory, and
an integral part in Tonry's (1995) application of marriageable males,
but it could easily serve as a measure of oppressive government at
titudes suggested by Lichtenstein (1996), Wilson (1971), and Walker
(1988).

This variable is the best of those included because, unlike

the others, incarceration necessarily precedes involvement in prison
industry programs.
2. Unemployment--This rate measures the percentage of newly
unemployed individuals.

The chronically unemployed, and those who

are no longer seeking work, are excluded from this rate.
chosen as it may be a measure of labor market weakness.

It was
It also is

integral to Rusche and Kirchheimer's theory (1967) (though, given
the lack of a drop in the incarceration rate, Rusche and Kirchheimer
alone is not a good rationale).

As unemployment measures those with

recent job losses, and much of the incarcerated population has lit
tle work experience (Sexton, et al., 1985), the variable may not
have anything directly to do with prison industry.
3.

Employment--This variable measures the percent of the non

incarcerated population that is employed.

It ties into Tonry's

(1995) use of William Julius Wilson's marriageable males theory.

It
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also serves as a measure of labor market strength.

As marriageable

males has held up to empirical testing (Wood, 1995), and employment
seems to be a predictor of who will not go to prison, there is rea
sonable expectation that employment may serve as a predictor of pri
son industry.

Some caution is to be used, though, as employment and

unemployment, though by no means jointly exhaustive, do covary.
4.

Labor union membership--This rate measures the percentage

of the American workforce that are members of a labor union.

Short

of real wage estimates, this was about the best measure of labor
strength I could generate.

Not only do labor unions and prison in

dustry share theoretical links through voluntariness and fairness of
competition, but Misrahi (1996) claims unions can be tied to the
downfall of the early prison industry systems.

Finally, before a

current industry can be fully competitive with the rest of the pri
vate sector; that is, be approved for interstate trade; it must con
sult with the local labor unions.

Thus, through the processes of

our government, labor unions are claimed to affect prison industry.
The rates were collected from two sources.

Incarceration

rates for 19965 were taken from the Bureau of Justice Statistics
(Gilliard & Beck, 1997). The other three rates were--the 1996 figures
taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (U.S. De
partment of Commerce, 1997).

These rates were put into a correla

tion matrix (see Table 1), to test for interaction with the depend
ent variables.
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Table 1
Variable (Pearson) Correlations for All Independent Variables
and Dependent Variables Which Produced Significant Findings
First
Variable

Second
Variable

Existence of Prison
Industry

Employment
Rate

Prison Industry
Rate

Incarceration
Rate

Job Training

Employment
Rate

Job Training

Incarceration
Rate

Incarceration
Rate

Unemployment
Rate

Employment Rate

Incarceration
Rate

Employment Rate

Unemployment
Rate

Pearson
Coefficient

.315
- .403

.389
- .371

.468
- . 714

-.620

Dependent Variables
Several variables were chosen to measure the existence, na
ture, and extent of prison industry in each state. --1.

The Existence of Prison Industry--This measures whether or

not competitive prison industry; defined as any instance in which
prisoners produce an item that is for sale on the open market (that
is, not government consumed), or in which prisoners provide a type
of service that is provided by a non-governmental labor source;
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exists within a state.
2.

Types of Labor--This measures the types of labor performed

within a prison industry setting. Categories include: Manufacturing,
White collar service, Blue collar service, and Recycling.
3.

Prisoner Pay--This question is divided into several parts.

First, officials were asked if prisoners are paid.
asked for wage ranges and average wage.

Then they were

Finally, they were asked if

there are any non-wage incentives for prisoners to work.

(For exam

ple, early release, improved facilities, or special privileges.)
4.

Job Training/Certification--This two part question in

volves asking if there are job training or certification programs
available.

If either answer is yes, respondents are asked to pro

vide specifics (that is, a specific certificate prisoners could
earn, or a specific job a prisoner would be qualified to do).
5.

Job-Placement--This asks if there are any formal job

placement programs available.

A yes response garners a request to

name a company or two that placed prisoners in post-release job
positions.

The second part of the question is asked under condi

tion that the company names will not be released and the companies
would not be contacted.

The names are requested to-verify the com

pany's existence, to ensure that only programs that have actually
placed prisoners in post-release positions are measured.
6.
programs.

Demographic Data--This requests three measures of industry
This data, combined with data on the total correctional

system, would provide an avenue to generate more ratio data, if

34

necessary.

This data includes the number of prisoners in prison

industry programs, the number of facilities in which prison industry
programs take place, and the top three facilities in terms of par
ticipating prisoners.6
Data Collection
Respondents were selected using the ACA (American Correctional
Association) 1996 Directory.7
the dependent variables.

A telephone survey was designed around

If an inappropriate state official was

reached, an alternate number was dialed that was either selected
from the ACA directory or provided by the incorrect state official
or by directory assistance.

Once the appropriate official was

reached, and consent was given, the survey was conducted.
respondent was requested per state.8
between ten and fifteen minutes.

Only one

On average, the survey lasted

However, the average response time

for a state without prison industry was five minutes, and the aver
age for states with a program was fifteen to twenty-five minutes.
Surveys were collected weekdays from March 19th, 1998 through April
3rd, 1998.

Forty-four states provided responses to the survey.

Coding

---

Once the survey data were collected, they were coded to pre
pare them for analysis.

When coding was finished, it became obvious

that some of the dependent variables had an insufficient number of
responses for analysis.

Some of the problems are listed below.
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1.

Prisoner Pay--There was much hesitancy amongst respondents

to report prisoner wages.
for intrastate programs.

This was more true for PIE programs than
Early in the data collection, the insis

tent response of prevailing wage, without giving ratio data, made
gathering enough wage data to produce meaningful analysis impossi
ble.

During data collection, it was discovered that a wage may not

be the best measure of worker conditions, and can be outright counter-intuitive.
chapter.

This idea will be dealt with in the recommendations

Those who did report data tended to report bi-modal pay

scales, in which a majority of prison industry programs reported
wages in the under $2 an hour range (intrastate only) or the $5-$7
an hour range (generally interstate).

Because of the lack of usable

data, analysis was not performed on the wage variable.
2.

Job Placement--Before data collection, the plan was to

only code responses that provided verifiable company names.

The

idea was to remove any programs that had informal or planned, but
not truly active, job placement services.
factors.

Problems arose due to two

First, only three states that responded Yes would answer

the company part of the question; California, Florida, and Tennessee.
Only two states, Florida and California, were prepared to make that
information part of the public record. If there had not been as many
informal responses as yes responses, I might ha�e thrown out the
question, altogether.

Instead, I coded yes responses at face value,

and informal and planning responses as no.

If I had found signifi

cant results with this variable, as coded, I would have felt it
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necessary to qualify the interpretation as tentative, needing fur
ther research.
3.

Demographic Data--In a number of cases, the term facili

ties was misconstrued as industries, (e.g., an expected response of
Smith State prison got the response, printing.)

Also, when the top

three facilities were given, it was not always in terms of partici
pating prisoners, often due to respondents readily lacking that spe
cific data.

These responses the researcher takes total blame for,

since respondents were usually near the twenty minute mark when this
question was asked.

After attempts to code the usable responses in

terms of security level failed, due to poor resources, the facility
aspects of the question were abandoned.

On a positive note, the

total (statewide) number of prisoners involved in prison industries
question produced useable ratio data.

These figures would be com

bined with CIA figures stating 1998 Correctional populations to
create a prison industry rate (see Table 2), or the percentage of
prisoners involved in competitive industry.

Please keep in mind

that several respondent states reported no prison industry (that
is, competitive use), ranking them as zeroes for analysis of Ex
istence of Prison Industry, and removing them from-the analysis of
other variables.
lowing states:

Prisoner labor is for state use only in the fol
Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland,

Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island,
Texas, and West Virginia.
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Table 2
Inmates Involved in Prison Industry Programs
State
New Hampshire
Montana
North Dakota
South Dakota
Indiana
Colorado
Oregon
South Carolina
North Carolina
Idaho
Florida
Ohio
Kentucky
Maine
Tennessee
Virginia
Utah
Nevada
Arizona
Wisconsin
Washington
Illinois
Delaware
Kansas
Mississippi
Minnesota
Nebraska
Alaska
Oklahoma
Louisiana
California

Number of Inmates*
500
350

110

217
1500
1200
700
1800
2400
300
4600
3200
700
98
800

1300

250
375
1059
700
440
1449
165
258
328
100

so

48
100
20
250

Percent of Total**
23.41
16.91
14.29
10.06
9.27
9.18
9.09
8.55
7.65
7.26
7 .11

6.77
6.59
6.41
5.60
5.20
5.20
4.86
4.55
4.37
3.76
3.58
3.49
3.31
2.41
1.91
1.75
1.27
.67
.11
;08

*Number of Inmates - Survey data collected on the number of
prisoners involve din prison industry programs.
**Percent of Total - Combines number of inmates with 1998 CIA
Directory figures to create the Prison Industry Rate, or the
percent of state prisoners involved in industry programs.
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Correlations Charts
Given the preliminary nature of this study, and the fact that
current incarceration theory left no clear way to predict relation
ships, correlation charts were generated comparing all variables
against each other.

These charts would be used to help regression

choices. (Results for selected variables are summarized in Table 1).
Regression Procedures
Multiple regression was almost removed from the study.

Ori

ginally, the average wage for industry workers was going to be used
as a dependent variable. However, correctional officials often could
not provide these figures; perhaps due in part to bimodal pay scales,
in which PIE workers' gross wages are significantly higher than in
trastate industry workers' gross wages.

While coding the data, I

considered using demographic data collected on prison industry to
generate rates for various prison industry conditions.

Generating a

prison industry rate, the percentage of prisoners involved in com
petitive labor, made it possible to apply multiple regression.
The logistic regression technique was selected, after instru
mentation was already designed, as the most efficient way to deal
with the lack of true ratio data.

The core text I worked with was

Munro and Page's Statistical Methods for Health Care Research (1993).
Through supplementary articles (Bendel & Carlin, 1990; Visser, 1994;
Schwartz, 1994; Steel & Holt, 1996), I learned of the ecological
fallacy, and the tendency for logistic regression to inflate results.

,//'
I
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Of the critical literature I read, there seemed to be an overall
acceptance of the use of the technique for generating a hypothesis.
,Since the literature written on prison industry would tend to sug
gest causal patterns that are convoluted or illogical, the focus of
the study became to generate theory.

If logistic regression yielded

significant results, then the findings would warrant further inves
tigation, mainly to verify that the findings were not due solely to
the result inflation that normally occurs with that technique.

If

multiple regression reinforced these findings, then a hypothesis
could be proposed and further studies could be guided in a more
efficient way.

Lack of consistent findings would compel us to ser

iously question the lack of provable relationships in the theory and
writings on prison industry, and move studies in different direc
tions.

CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS
The findings section is divided into three parts:

(1) a uni

variate report on the survey data collected, (2) a report on the
multiple regression portion, and (3) a report on the logistic regres
sion portion.
Univariate Findings
Forty-four states completed the survey, with six states unable
or unwilling to participate.

Thirty-one of those states had prison

industry programs in existence. The majority of those states, seven
teen, had some mixture of intrastate and interstate (PIE) industry
programs.

The following describe prison industry programs, with the

percent of the thirty one states with prison industry programs given,
and the raw number of respondents in parenthesis.
Types of Inmate Labor Programs
The types of inmate labor programs are as follows:
states (93.55%), the prisons had manufacturing programs.

In 29
In 18

states (58.06%) the prisons had inmates working blue collar service
positions.

In 19 states (61.29%) the prisons had inmates working

white collar service positions.

In 13 states (41.94%) the prisons

had inmates recycling.
40
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Opportunities for Prison Industry Workers
Opportunities for prison industry workers are as follows:
23 states (74.19%) the prisons had job training programs.
(25.81%) the prisons had job certification programs.

In

In 8 states

In 6 states,

(19.35%) the prisons had job placement programs.9
These percentages indicated that prison industry programs have
prisoners engaging in many types of labor.

While job training is an

integral part of most prison industry programs, formalized certifi
cation or job-placement seem to occur only in exceptional cases,
with only a handful of states mandating certification.
All states surveyed paid inmates wages.

Ten states (32.26%)

offered early release or good time credit for industry workers.
States with prison industry programs had an average of 818 industry
workers (with a range of 20-4600), or 6.28% of the incarcerated
population (with a range of .08%-23.41%) (See Table 2).
Multiple Regression
The initial regression weighed all four independent variables
against the prison industry rate, the percent of prisoners involved
in competitive industry (see Table 2). This model produced betas for
unemployment and employment of -.828 and -.445, respectively. Match
ing signs for these rates are counter-intuitive, and these two rates
are highly correlated (with a Pearson correlation of -.620, see
Table 1).

Given this, and a highly unstable model (a condition in

dex of 94.556 at the fifth dimension), it was assumed that there was
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heavy statistical interaction occurring.

As this assumption fits

well with common sense, and Tonry's application of marriageable
males theory, both employment and unemployment were left out of the
final model.
Regressing the prison industry rate a�ainst both the incarcer
ation rate and the labor union membership rate (model found in Table
3) produced an R-square of .233 and an adjusted R-square of .179,
which means this model explains eighteen percent of the variance of
the prison industry rate.
Table 3
Multiple Regression Results
Dependent Variable--Prison Industry Rate
Variable

Beta

Standard
Error

Significance

Tolerance VIF

Incarceration

-.017

.006

.009

.913

1.095

Labor

-.252

.157

.119

.913

1.095

15.095

3.292

.000

Constant

The final model, which excluded employment and unemployment as
independent variables due to statistical interaction, leaves the
Prison Industry Rate weighed against the incarceration rate and the
labor union membership rate.
.179 (n = 31).
.009.

The model has an adjusted R square of

Only the incarceration rate tested significant, at

The Beta for incarceration was -.017, with a standard error
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of .006, and standardized Beta of -.485.
relatively tight fit.

This means the model has a

A tolerance of .913 and a Variance Inflation

Factor (VIF) of 1.095 means there is not a great deal of interaction
between the incarceration rate and the labor union membership rate.
Finally, a condition index of 8.332 at the third dimension indicates
that this is a fairly stable model.
Logistic Regression
The logistic regressions yielded some significant results (See
Table 4).

The first dependent variable to do so was the existence

of prison industry.
equation.

All independent variables were entered into the

As no signs were counter-intuitive, variables with signi

ficance levels higher than .20, the unemployment rate and the in
carceration rate, were eliminated from the equation.

This left the

employment rate and the labor union membership rate.

In this model,

the labor union membership rate tested insignificant (.1375), but
the employment rate tested significant at the .047 level (in a model
with 44 cases), and had a logic coefficient of 1.2049.

This means

that prison industry is 1.2 times as likely to exist per percent
increase in employment.
The other logistic regression to yield significant results
was job training.

Here too, no signs were counter-intuitive, and

the incarceration rate and unemployment rate were eliminated from
the model.

This left a model with employment, significant at .0818,

and the labor union membership rate, insignificant at .1989.
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Table 4
Logistic Regression Results
Dependent
Variable

Independent
Variable
Beta

Significance

Existence
of Prison
Industry
n=44

Employment
Labor
Constant

.1864
-.0920
-9.7640

.0470
.1375
.0960

1.2049
.9121

Job
Training
n=31

Employment
Constant

.2627
-15.8272

.0447
.0574

1.3004

Job
Certification
=
24
n

Employment
Incarceration
Unemployment
Labor
Constant

.0200

.9138

1.0202

.0008

.8781

1.0008

-.0163
.0633
-2.9276

.9778
.6282
.8335

.9838
1.0654

PIE
Certification
=
31
n

Employment
Incarceration
Unemployment
Labor
Constant

.1236

.5662

1.1315

.0057

.2730

1.0057

.1479
.0781
-10.2559

.8420
.5131
.5425

1.1594
1.0812

Job
Placement
=31
n

Employment
Incarceration
Unemployment
Labor
Constant

-.7088

.0417

.4922

-.0078

.1903

.9923

-.1015
.2510
43.5218

.8937
.1285
.0668

.9035
1.2853

Logic
Coefficient

Table 4 lists the significant logistic equations, using the
dependent variables Existence of Prison Industry and Job Training.

It

also lists results for usable survey data that produced no significant
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results (Job Training, PIE Certification, and Job Placement).
Given the labor union membership rate's proximity to the .20
cutoff, I decided to eliminate it from the model.

This left the

employment rate, significant at the .0447 level, with a logic co
efficient of 1.3004.

This means that job t�aining is 1.3 times as

likely to exist per percent increase in the employment rate.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study seemed to modify the causa�ion of prison industry
programs as theorized by Rusche and Kirchheimer (1967). Though their
premise that unemployment effects incarceration failed to receive
support from this study, Rusche and Kirchheimer's conclusion that
incarceration directly influences prison industry was supported.
However, Tonry's application of marriageable males seems a better
theory for explaining the link, as employment rates were highly
correlated with incarceration rates (-.365), and the possible link
between employment and incarceration warrants further study, perhaps
in a path analysis of the variables:

employment, incarceration,

labor union membership, and the prison industry rate.
While the incarceration rate and the employment rate both
yielded significant results, other indicators of labor strength and
incarceration policy could be used in the analysis, and might serve
as better indicators. Figures like real wages, overtime hours worked,
job benefits, and the underemployment rate could provide better mea
sures of labor market strength.

Also, length of sentence, probation

rates, and parole rates could provide insights into incarceration
policy.
In addition, this study made certain assumptions, like the
inherent difference between competitive prison industry and state
46
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use prisoner labor, that warrant further testing.

While data col

lected seemed to indicate a relationship between the prison industry
rate and the incarceration rate, the survey data needs to be con
firmed.

Also, these results should be compared to the results using

the same independent variables, with state use prisoner labor rates
and prisoner work rates (total industry and state use workers) as
the dependent variables.
In order to conduct better analysis, prison industry programs
need to be studied at much smaller levels, and terminology needs to
be more universal.

Case data could be collected on individuals in

the programs, dealing with demographic data, length of sentence,
security level, and employment experience prior to incarceration.
This would allow those conducting analysis to draw better conclu
sions regarding how certain prisoners become involved with industry
programs, while others do not.

With cooperation from parole agen

cies, recidivism data could be collected and combined with the de
mographic data to determine if prisoners participating in industry
programs have a lower recidivism rate than non-participating pri
soners.

A smaller level of analysis would also help evaluate claims

that prison industry programs are initiated in order to balance bud
gets or provide the unskilled inmate valuable work training. 10
A move toward a more universal terminology for the types of
prison industry programs, along with prisoner labor programs, would
facilitate more meaningful studies.

This study used the term prison

industry to denote the competitive use of prisoner workers.

The
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acceptance of the use of this term varied from state to state.

Many

alternative terms were suggested, with private enterprise and joint
venture being the most popular.

The same could be said of this

study's use of prison labor, with state-use industries being the
most popular suggestion to replace it.

While the choice of terms to

designate what type of work prisoners perform is unimportant, the
fact that clear distinctions need to be made is very important.

A

given program is either competitive with the private sector or it is
not.

A given program either involves the private sector or it does

not.

A given program is either state-use or it is not.

That a pri

son work program can develop with several combinations of these
three conditions makes a good case for more universal terms.

For

example, there are vast differences among the following; a private
prison that produces state-use furniture, a state run customer model
furniture enterprise that sells to the private sector, a PIE program
that sells furniture exclusively to the state (thereby being exempt
from Walsh-Healey and possibly qualifying for superpreference), and
a jail work release program which allows those jailed to work at a
local private furniture company. Given this, it becomes clearer that
current popular uses of these terms in part aids the political con
fusion surrounding debates on the use of prisoner workers.

There

fore, agreeing on universal distinctive terms could not only aid the
rational study of prison work programs, but also enable the rational
debate of prison work programs.
Finally, this project made very clear two realities a re-
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searcher studying prison industry must face. First was the necessity
to keep time order accuracy in light of constantly changing legisla
tion and program focus. Second was the extreme caution one must take
in accepting wage data at face value.
Time order is extremely important to _developing a causal model
for any relationship.

What makes this a particularly difficult task

is that the conditions of prison industry are subject to both fed
eral and state legislatures and courts.

This is further complicated

by the rate of implementation, which can vary from state to state
and from prison to prison.

Numerous times in the survey process I

was told that a condition I was asking about had recently been re
pealed by the legislature, or had been enabled and was due to take
effect in less than a month.

Such turbulent conditions make the

case for more regional and local analysis even stronger, as state
courts and state legislatures could be monitored more closely.
Ratio data available on prison industry, such as inmate wages,
seem a tempting way to measure the actual conditions of prison in
dustry.

But, taken out of context, inmate wages can grossly mis

represent the economic reality of the program in question.

For

instance, say the state of Freedonia has two customer model prison
industry programs, one intrastate and the other a PIE program.

In

mates working the intrastate program receive $2 an hour, with $.SO
in deductions for room and board.

Inmates working the PIE program

receive $5.50 an hour, with $4 in deductions for taxes, victim's
compensation, and room and board.

Since in the customer model, the

so
state controls the unit price of goods sold to the private sector,
the economic realities of the two different wages may be identical.
Then, assume that Freedonia decides that PIE programs really
don't fit well into their state economy, so the legislature decides
to replace it with an intrastate employer model program, to which
the former PIE customer agrees.
programs are now identical.

Wages and deductions for the two

For the inmate, her or his economic

reality has not changed. Depending on whether or not the state could
manage a profit under the PIE program, the state's economic reality
may not have changed, either.

But for the private business, this

shift from a PIE customer to an intrastate employer meant the dif
ference from getting their goods at a wholesale price to getting
their goods at a sub-manufactured price.
cal

However, this hypotheti

does not take into account other issues, such as whether the

company or the state pays inmate medical bills, or covers worker's
compensation for injuries.

But it does demonstrate just how complex

the money exchanges in prison industry programs can become, and how
it is possible that such data, taken out of context, may not accu
rately represent the economic realities of the competition that a
given program provides.
In summary, prison industry programs are growing at a phe
nomenal rate, with most states acquiring a program in the last
twenty years.

A given program's manifestation can change quickly.

With expansion into new labor and sales markets, industry programs
often have to meet new and different standards.

Academic theory on
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prison industry must also change to suit the times.

Immediate study

is needed so we can understand why these programs exist, because
only with this understanding can we both prevent the exploitative
abuses the industry system has had in the past, and at the same time
ensure that worthwhile programs are not nee�lessly eliminated by the
often hysterical trends of a global economy.

ENDNOTES
1 Real

wages and measures of worker benefits were also con

sidered, but not only seemed fairly complex, but lacked much of the
historical, theoretical, and legal justification that labor union
membership already possessed.
2To include marriage as a predictor of incarceration would
prove cumbersome at this juncture, as it would further complicate
the interaction effects that would seem to already be present, like
those between employment and unemployment.

As stated, a direct re

lationship between employment and marriage has been found, and for
the purposes of this project, it is sufficient.
3All

the readings I have done indicate that Federal Prison

Industries (FPI) and UNICOR refer to essentially the same program.
An author's choice of acronyms is often arbitrary.

For the purposes

of this paper, the two are used interchangeably.
4Admittedly,

I did ask one respondent about one of the sev

eral replacement accusa�ions Elbow had made.

The respondent knew

nothing about such a program, but suggested Elbow might be talking
about a jail work release program, which is a county, not state,
affair.

The fact that such divisions and differences can be com

pletely overlooked by those writing editorial pieces makes an excel
lent case for more qualified research to be done on inmate labor at
all levels.
5The 1996 data is being used for several reasons.
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Most
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importantly, wince this survey was conducted largely in the first
quarter of 1998, it could be assumed that the most readily avail
able respondent data might be garnered from 1997 figures.

Secondly,

as recent employment and incarceration data have seen relatively few
sharp increases or decreases, the time lapse_ should have little ef
fect on the results.
6The

facilities question was an ill-fated attempt to quickly

determine demographic data such as gender and security level of the
prison industry workers, without asking three to four individual
questions.

The coding section describes several reasons this at

tempt went awry.
7In the process of data collection, I was informed of a much
faster way to acquire much of the information I was looking for, the
Correctional Industries Association Annual Directory.

In addition

to charts detailing much of the demographic data any study of pri
soner labor would require, it also includes invaluable contact num
bers.

The CIA directory was not used to collect prison industry

data for this study, but was used as a source of information for the
literature review, and used to generate the Prison Industry Rate
(see Table 2).
8A

few states asked that I speak to individuals in charge of

different programs.

Others requested a fax of the questionnaire, so

they could gather answers and confirm me as legitimate.

These re

quests, although not formally listed in the methodology, were accom
modated.
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9Many

states had informal job placement mechanisms in place.

A few states, while training inmates for certifiable positions, can
not by law grant convicts that certification.

Hence, the inmates

must wait until they are released to be officially certified.
1 °For

instance, a program that is state�use, or competitive and

non-profitable, might not be reaching a goal of budget balancing.
Also, a program that only selects inmates with prior work experience
(that is, inmates with prior work skills), might not be reaching a
goal of training unskilled workers.

Appendix A
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Human Subjects lnstrtutional Review Board

Kalamazoo. Michigan 4900!3-3899

WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSllY

Date: 5 March 1998
To:

Zoann Snyder-Joy, Principal Investigator
Eric Dill, Student Investigator

From, Ri,h,ud Wright, Chm, .
Re:

QJ,.J Q .'11',Jt-

HSIRB Project Number 98-01-11

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled "Factors Influencing
Prison Industry" has been approved under the exempt category of review by the Human
Subjects Institutional Review Board. The conditions and duration of this approval are specified
in the Policies of Western Michigan University. You may now begin to implement the research
as described in the application.
Please note that you may only conduct this research exactly in the form it was approved. You
must seek specific board approval for any changes in this project. You must also seek reapproval
if the project extends beyond the termination date noted below. In addition if there are any
unanticipated adverse reactions or unanticipated events associated with the conduct of this
research, you should immediately suspend the project and contact the Chair of the HSIRB for
consultation.
The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.
Approval Termination:

5 March 1998
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Date_!_!__

Prison Industries Survey Instrument
State Surveyed :

Official Contacted :
Time

Reschedule Date

Phone (

)

_________

Alternate Official: -------- Ph (
Alternate Official: -------- Ph (

)
)

Hello, may I speak to (see above)
Hello, my name is Erik Dill.

I am inviting you to participate

in a research project entitled •Factors Influencing Prison Indus
try.•

It is my thesis project at Western Michigan University,

department of Sociology, and Dr. Zoann Snyder-Joy is my faculty ad
visor.

The survey will take approximately 3-15 minutes of your time

an designed to measure your state's involvement in prison indus
tries, with the project goal being a nationwide analysis of prison
industry programs.
to participate.

You may choose not to answer any question or not

Answering a question indicates your consent to use

the answer you supply.

If you have any questions, you may contact

myself at ###-###-####, my faculty advisor Dr. Zoann Snyder-Joy at
###-###-####, the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board at (616)
387-8293, or the Vice President for Research at (616) 387-8298.
Just to confirm my information, I am speaking to (see above).
Is there a correctional official other than yourself that I should
be speaking to regarding the nature and extent of prison industry in
your state?

(If yes, fill in alternate official space above.)

Thank you.
survey now.
zone.

If you are willing, I would like to conduct the

(If not, seek an alternate contact time, including time

Remember to confirm phone number.)
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1)

Are there currently prison industry programs in your state?
[For survey purposes, prison industry is any instance in which

prisoners produce an item that is for sale on the open market (that
is, not government consumed) OR in which prisoners provide a type of
service that is provided by a non-governmen�al labor source.]
If no, forward to the final page.
If yes:

(Survey complete).

As there is prison industry in your state, I will be asking

you questions as to the nature and extent of your prison industry
programs.
First, I would like to ask what types of labor are being per
formed by prisoners in your prison industry programs.

Does your

state have prisoners performing any of the following in a prison
industry setting?
___ Manufacturing - Taking raw materials and making a finished
product (wood to furniture).
White collar service - Any type of clerical or information
service (data entry).
Blue collar service - Any form of manual labor that produces
no product (stocking shelves).
Recycling - The conversion of post-consumer/post-governmental
waste into raw materials or other products (compost).
The next questions cover if and how prisoners are compensated for
their participation in these programs.
Are the prisoners paid?
If yes,
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How much are the prisoners paid?
If varies
What is a wage range for prisoners involved in your programs?
And
What is the average wage for a prisoner involved in your programs?
Are there any non-wage incentives for prisoners to work in your
state?
(Examples might include: Early release; improved facilities; or
special privileges.)
If vague Could you please tell me more about (their words from
above)?
That is, what are the practical benefits of (their words from
above) for the prisoner?
Are prisoners given the opportunity to earn job specific training or
certification from their prison labor experience?
If vague Could you please name a specific job title each prisoner is
qualified for, or a specific certification or degree each prisoner
could earn?
Are there any post release job placement programs associated with
your industry program?
If yes

Could you please list the names and locations of specific

companies (or agencies) involved specifically with the placement of
participants in your state's programs?
Name

Location

Name

Location
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Finally, I would like some demographic data on your state's prison
industry:
How many prisoners participate in your prison
industry programs?
At how many facilities are prisop industry programs
currently running?
Please list the (facilities/top three facilities) in terms of
participating prisoners):
Facility

Location

Number of prisoners___

Facility

Location

Number of prisoners

Facility

Location

Number of prisoners

Thank you for your participation.

The information you have

given me will be used in a nationwide comparative analysis of prison
industry.
If you wish to contact me with any questions or concerns, my
home phone number is ###-###-####.

I can be reached by email at

X91DILL@wmich.edu. My faculty advisor is Dr. Zoann Snyder
Joy.

She office phone number is ###-###-####.

Either of us can be

contacted by writing to the following address:
Department of Sociology
Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, MI 49008-5189
You may also contact the following with any questions or concerns.
Human Subjects Institutional Review Board at (616) 387-8293.
The Vice President for research at (616) 387-8298.
Thank you again.

Goodbye.
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